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Extended Deterrence and Security Guarantees 
Extended deterrence consists in extending the logic of deterrence to a third party, that is, 
persuading a potential adversary that the costs of attacking a protected country would exceed its 
benefits through a security guarantee given to the protected party. To a large degree, it stems 
from any form of military alliance between a stronger country and a weaker one—although 
alliances per se generally include a mutual defense commitment, which is not a prerequisite to 
extended deterrence. 
Extended deterrence may translate into various kinds of arrangements. At one end of the 
spectrum, extended deterrence may rely on mere unilateral statements of protection. At the other 
end, it may rely on the permanent presence of nuclear weapons on the protected country’s 
territory. In between is often a web of policy statements, consultations mechanisms, joint 
exercises and planning, defense cooperation, ports visits, and presence of foreign troops—
varying from country to country. If the protector has nuclear weapons, extended deterrence may 
become, explicitly or not, a form of extended nuclear deterrence. But the protector may have an 
interest in maintaining ambiguity on this point. Any State aggressor foolish enough to confront a 
nuclear-armed protector would do it at its own peril. 
A security guarantee given by a nuclear protector can be a useful nuclear-nonproliferation 
measure. This is the main function of what is called today “assurance” in the United States. 
Whereas the credibility of the “deterrence” part of a security guarantee is to be appreciated by the 
potential adversaries, the credibility of its assurance part is to be appreciated by the protected 
country. The lack of a strong security guarantee, or doubts about the scope and value of an 
existing one, have been key drivers of nuclear proliferation since 1949. China, France, Israel, 
India, Pakistan, North Korea and South Africa did not benefit from a security guarantee (or did not 
consider it as being credible) when they went nuclear. For countries which are known to have 
embarked in a nuclear program—or to have seriously entertained the thought—the question of 
security guarantees also loomed large. Most did not benefit from such a guarantee at all, or felt 
that it was weakening; and most of those who gave up their nuclear option in the face of a clear 
threat only did so when they felt reassured that they would be adequately protected, formally or 
not. The fact is that countries that considered or embarked in a nuclear program did not benefit 
from a credible security guarantee, and most of those countries who gave up the nuclear option in 
the face of a threat benefited from such a guarantee. This quasi-universal correlation suggests 
that such guarantees are critical as a nuclear non-proliferation measure. 
The requirements of deterrence and assurance may not be identical. A modest conventional 
presence on the protected country’s territory, for instance, may be enough as a “trip-wire” or as a 
symbol of commitment—thus providing significant assurance, but not necessarily enough 
deterrence. Conversely, a very small chance of nuclear use to protect an ally may be enough to 
convince an adversary that the cost would not be worth it—thus providing significant deterrence, 
but not necessarily enough assurance. The NATO Cold War doctrine of flexible response was an 
attempt to bridge the gap between these two different requirements. It also sought to resolve a 
dilemma which is at the heart of extended deterrence: simultaneously reducing what a U.S. 
expert recently called the twin fears of “entrapment” (for the protector) and “abandonment” (for 
the protected).[1] 
The international debate on extended deterrence is mostly about the scope, role and value of 
American security commitments. It is generally acknowledged that Washington has given nuclear 
security guarantees to about 30 countries, including North Atlantic Treaty (NATO) member 
States, Japan and South Korea. Whether or not other U.S. allies, bound to Washington by treaty 
(such as Australia, Thailand and the Philippines) or by statements of commitment (such as Israel, 
Taiwan) can be considered as covered by a nuclear umbrella is left unsaid, in some cases 
deliberately so.[2] There is no clear distinction in these matters, and ambiguity is part of 
deterrence. 
Extended Deterrence in the Gulf Region 
The United States is the main external security provider in the Gulf region. However, there is no 
treaty-based security guarantee given to US allies in the area. The existence of such a guarantee 
stems essentially from a range of unilateral American statements, bilateral security agreements, 
and the presence of U.S. military forces in the region. As early as 1945, the United States 
informally committed itself to be the guarantor of Saudi Arabia’s security. In the aftermath of the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, fears of a “push towards the South” led President Jimmy Carter to 
affirm in January 1980 that “any attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf 
region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America and 
such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.”[3] 
Today, there is a U.S. military presence in Bahrain, which hosts the US Fifth Fleet, and in Qatar, 
which hosts US Central Command (CENTCOM) facilities. Bahrain and Kuwait have also been 
granted the status of “Major Non-NATO Allies,” respectively in 2002 and 2004. Reinforced 
security guarantees were given to countries of the Gulf region after the 1990-1991 Iraq war. As a 
result, there is now an informal or de facto commitment to defend several of the Gulf States. 
However, since 2003, the picture has changed. Most US land forces left the Arabian Peninsula 
invasion of Iraq, the performance of the United States is seen as less than satisfying, and other 
powers (China in particular) have increased their influence. The so-called “Shi’a revival,” 
combined with growing evidence of Iranian nuclear intentions (along with the development of an 
increasingly mature ballistic missiles program), have led to a renewal of the debate on extended 
deterrence in the Gulf region. 
It is important to note that in this regard the situation in the Middle East differs from the two other 
main regions where the United States has an extended deterrence policy, namely Europe and 
East Asia. In both these regions, there are treaty-based commitments to defend allies; in addition, 
numerous US statements over the years have made it clear that the nuclear component was part 
of this extended deterrence policy. The post-1991 agreements reportedly “do not formally require 
the United States to come to the aid of any of the Gulf states if they are attacked, according to 
U.S. officials familiar with their contents.”[4] 
Many analysts—not only in Washington—fear that failing to reassure Gulf allies may lead them to 
look for alternative strategic options to ensure their security. Despite its very limited capabilities in 
the nuclear field, Saudi Arabia often tops the list of three or four countries which could “go 
nuclear” if and when Iran does. As a second-best option, Saudi Arabia could ask Pakistan, a 
country with which it has had a very close relationship for decades, to give it a nuclear guarantee. 
Such a guarantee could even be entrenched by the presence of Pakistani nuclear weapons on 
Saudi soil but remaining under Islamabad’s control, thus mimicking the NATO “nuclear sharing” 
arrangements. Pakistan could consider that such an arrangement would have advantages in 
terms of the survivability of its arsenal: weapons stationed in the Arabian Peninsula would pose a 
major political and operational challenge for New-Delhi and probably negate its preemptive strike 
options. While Islamabad and Riyad both have friendly relations with the West, such a radical 
change in the nuclear picture may have unforeseen and unwanted consequences. 
For their part, many US allies fear that the evolving Iranian nuclear crisis could only have 
negative consequences for them: either Iran will end up having the Bomb, or the United States 
will end up making a “grand bargain” with Tehran. Both outcomes would be losing propositions 
from the point of view of Gulf countries, leading them to lose faith in the value of U.S. protection. 
Some in the region have also noticed that the United States has renewed its commitment to the 
security of Israel in a forceful way during the Bush presidency, and do not want to feel “left out.”[5] 
For these reasons, Washington has been keen in recent years on reassuring its allies on its 
commitment to their security, including by approving additional sales of military equipment and 
missile defense. Many authors have called for an explicit reinforcement of security guarantees to 
U.S. allies.[6] But so far Washington has adopted a fairly prudent attitude. The most explicit public 
statement so far in that regard has been US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s much noticed 
proposal (in fact, more likely a trial balloon) of a “defense umbrella.”[7] It is to be noted that many 
in the Middle East have interpreted this carefully worded expression as being akin to a “nuclear 
protection.”[8] 
The United States seems to hope that extended deterrence could also perhaps have a 
“dissuasion” role. This is what Mrs. Clinton sought by stating that a defense umbrella over the 
Middle East would negate a possible Iranian nuclear capability, thus apparently hoping to 
discourage Tehran to build the Bomb. 
Reinforcing Extended Deterrence in the Gulf: Problems and Dilemmas 
The reinforcement of security guarantees raises significant problems and dilemmas, which have 
been studied at length during the Cold war, in particular in Europe. How to avoid the “free-riding” 
problem of collective defense? How to ensure that assurances of protection are not interpreted by 
States in the region as a green light for regional military adventures?[9] 
However, the Gulf is very different from early Cold War Europe, and presents specific challenges. 
1. First, both Washington and its Gulf allies do not want to appear as if they have given 
up on persuading Iran to roll back its nuclear program. This is one reason why Mrs. 
Clinton’s speech was coldly received among some elites of the region.  
2. Second, since the end of the Cold war, and most importantly since the September 11 
attacks, questions have been raised in the United States about the wisdom to continue 
giving protection to countries whose values are seen as being different or not 
compatible with those of the West. The fact that a majority of the perpetrators of the 
September 11 attacks came from Saudi Arabia is well-remembered by the U.S. public 
opinion. The idea of “dying for Berlin” of “trading Washington for London” was difficult 
enough a challenge at the time of the Cold War; nobody should expect U.S. elites to be 
ready to “die for Dubai” or “trade Washington for Riyadh.”  
3. Third, the problem may also exist the other way round. Some countries may not want 
to be too openly and explicitly protected by the United States. A formal security 
guarantee to Saudi Arabia, for instance, which would mean admitting reliance on the 
United States for its security, may be challenged from within.[10] It might be seen in the 
region as an act of “colonialism.”[11] Also, many in the Middle East do not want an 
open US nuclear guarantee for fear that it would mean being considered by Iran as an 
enemy. The Egyptian reaction to the US idea was revealing. Cairo has made it clear 
that it would not want to be part of such an arrangement—probably for a mix of 
domestic and diplomatic reasons. After Mrs. Clinton’s statement, President Mubarak 
stated that Egypt “will not be part of any American nuclear umbrella intended to protect 
the Gulf countries,” judging that it would imply “accepting foreign troops and experts on 
our land—and we do not accept that” and “an explicit acceptance that there is a 
regional nuclear power—we do not accept that either.”[12] 
For these reasons, no “Cold War Europe”-like quick fix is available for bolstering extended 
deterrence in the Gulf. Some experts have called for caution, for instance, in any overt 
deployment of large additional U.S. forces in the region to bolster the U.S. security 
commitment.[13] (To be sure, there does not seem to be any overt call for such reinforcements 
from regional elites.) 
There may thus be some value in maintaining a measure of ambiguity in U.S. security guarantees 
to the Gulf countries. This supposes of course that leaders of Gulf countries feel reassured by 
private statements of assurance by the U.S. administration. And here, there may be a measure of 
cultural specificity at work. Contrary to what is the case in Europe and East Asia, Gulf leaders, 
according to Emile Hokayem, an international affairs commentator based in Abu Dhabi, may 
“prefer to live with the current ambiguity, where they know what to expect from the U.S. because 
of very high-level personalized diplomacy, and not announce anything formal that would further 
that would further alienate Iran.”[14] He judges that a nuclear umbrella “adds nothing to the 
current U.S. defense commitment in the region and denies everyone the ambiguity needed to 
deal with Tehran.”[15] For these reasons, he calls for “an assurance along the same lines 
conveyed secretly to the Gulf leaderships by the most senior U.S. officials.”[16] 
The problem, of course, is that deterrence also requires a measure of clarity to ensure that the 
message is loudly and clearly heard by potential adversaries. Squaring this circle is the main 
challenge for U.S. diplomacy in the months and years to come.[17] 
In the Gulf region, extended deterrence is a particularly acute challenge, where it will be 
particularly difficult do simultaneously satisfy the requirements of “deterrence” (vis-à-vis potential 
adversaries), “reassurance” (vis-à-vis friendly governments), and “acceptability” (vis-à-vis their 
public opinions). For these reasons, rather than a new, forceful blanket public statement (a new 
“Carter doctrine”), country-specific arrangements and declarations may be a more appropriate 
options. They would have to be backed by enhanced mechanisms for combined (multinational) 
joint military planning. 
Some doubt that an open defense umbrella would have any credibility for the smaller Gulf States 
given their size and proximity to Iran. According to Mustafa Alani, a prominent expert based in 
Dubai, “This state is very small. If the Iranian attack happens, this state will disappear in five 
seconds, so what is the umbrella going to do?.”[18] In other words, the belief in the value of the 
U.S. deterrent does not appear to be universally shared in the region. However, is there a serious 
alternative?[19] Europe appears to play a complementary role here—despite the fact that it is 
also a US competitor for lucrative arms deals—but is no substitute for the U.S. protection. 
 
European Security Commitments in the Gulf Region 
For historical, geographical, economic and strategic reasons, Europe cannot remain indifferent to 
the security of the Gulf area. The European Union imports 21.1% of its oil from the Middle East 
(including 9.0% from Saudi Arabia and 6.4% from Iran)[20], and many European countries are 
increasingly looking at the Gulf region as a gas provider to reduce their dependency on Russia. 
After years of negotiations, a GCC-EU free trade agreement is expected to be signed in 2009 or 
2010. The first-ever common European military operations were conducted in the Gulf (Operation 
Cleansweep, 1987-1988). 
European powers have given security guarantees in various forms to several Gulf States after the 
1991 Gulf war. In addition to its longstanding commitment to the security of Djibouti (1977), 
France has signed several defense agreements with Kuwait (1992), Qatar (1994, 1998), and the 
United Arab Emirates (1996, 2009). The content of these agreements has not been made public 
and is said to vary from one instance to another—they are country-specific. However, various 
official statements make it possible to give a sense of their content. Through the agreement with 
Kuwait, for instance, Paris has “committed itself to guarantee the security of this country,” 
according to the French Foreign Ministry.[21] Likewise, a parliamentary report stated that the 
agreement with Qatar “committed France to participate, under certain conditions, to the defense 
of Qatar against an external aggression.”[22] 
It is generally acknowledged that the French bilateral agreement with the UAE is particularly 
strong. As revised in 2009, it states, according to President Sarkozy, that the two countries 
“would jointly decide of specific and tailored responses, including military ones, if the security, the 
sovereignty, the territorial integrity and the independence of the UAE was threatened.”[23] 
This should not come as a surprise given that the UAE has become one of the main strategic 
partners of France in recent years (along with Qatar) in the region. The opening in May 2009 of a 
permanent joint base in Abu Dhabi is a milestone for Paris, since all other French permanent 
bases abroad are hosted by former colonies and are a legacy of history.[24] It followed a string of 
bilateral agreements with the UAE in the cultural and education field, through which the French 
have “franchised” some of their most cherished trademarks: the Louvre museum, the Sorbonne 
University, and the Saint-Cyr military school.[25] Additionally, Paris has made a bid for the sale of 
two latest-generation EPR nuclear reactors to the Emirates—the only Middle East country to 
which it seriously envisions to sell such reactor. 
Today French Mirage aircraft participate in the air defense of the Emirates, acting as a de facto 
“trip wire” for the broader involvement of the French armed forces in case of conflict. As an official 
put it bluntly, “if Iran attacked, we would be attacked too.”[26] At the occasion of the inauguration 
of the Abu Dhabi base, questions were raised about whether or not the new agreement included 
provisions for nuclear defense of the Emirates, especially since presidential advisers said that this 
was about “deterrence.”[27] The French Ministry of Defense was quick to clarify that the French 
nuclear doctrine was unchanged: a “deterring presence” should not be confused with “nuclear 
deterrence”; as in the past, nuclear weapons could only be used for the defense of French “vital” 
interests, and it would be up to the President to decide whether or not such interests were at 
stake in a Gulf contingency.[28] 
The United Kingdom also has its own defense commitments, notably with the UAE (1996). The 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office states that “our Defence Cooperation Agreement represents 
our largest defence commitment outside NATO.”[29] Ivan Levis, UK Minister of State at the 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, confirmed in 2009 that “the UAE is one of the UK’s closest 
allies.”[30] 
The role of the French and UK extended deterrence postures in the Gulf can be, to some extent, 
compared with their role in NATO (with the caveats that the role of their nuclear forces is openly 
acknowledged in the Atlantic Alliance context). They complement the US security guarantees 
without being a possible alternative to it: their existence would complicate the calculations of a 
potential adversary. Moreover, perceptions of French (and to a certain extent UK) actions in the 
region do not suffer from the same negative connotations of U.S. “imperialism.” UK and French 
cooperation enhance the “internationalization” of Gulf security policies, something that many 
among the regional elites appreciate. 
It is clear that among Gulf countries, the United Arab Emirates have a special place given the 
strength of UK and French commitments there.[31] Thus any aggressor threatening the UAE has 
to know that he could face not just which would have to face not one, but three major Western 
military players, which are also nuclear powers and permanent members of the United Nations 
Security Council. 
The Question of US-UK-French Coordination 
These developments raise the question of whether—and if yes to which extent—the deterrence 
postures and declaratory policies of the United States, the United Kingdom and France in the 
region should be better coordinated. There would certainly be clear merit in having close trilateral 
consultation and perhaps even joint generic military planning for responding to an aggression in 
the Gulf. France’s decision to rejoin the NATO military structure in 2009 would probably help here 
(even though there is no reason why NATO as such would be involved[32]). On the question of a 
possible joint public deterrence statement, however, there are arguments on both sides. A clear 
collective expression of intent by Washington, Paris and London to protect their allies may be a 
powerful deterrent. But there could also be some value in letting potential adversaries wonder 
what each country’s reactions and possible “red lines” would be. In any case, an in-depth 
conversation between the three countries on possible scenarios and planning for a major military 
contingency in the Gulf is long overdue. 
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home page. 
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